This research endeavors to introduce a novel concept in ethics, namely ethics based on the primacy of existence, drawing upon Aṣālat al-wujūd, the theory of the primacy of existence in ontology. Mullā Sadrā's philosophy, which has three basic tenets—the primacy of existence, substantial motion (Ḥarakat-i Juharī), and gradation in existence (Tashkīk-i wujūd)—is the basis for this doctrine. The primacy of existence holds that quiddity is a mental construct and that existence is fundamental. The writers distinguished between two conceptions of ethics in this regard: one based on existence and the other on quiddity. Human quiddity is fixed and does not grade, hence ethics based on quiddity's primacy will always be fixed and the same for every individual. Moral obligations are universal and shared by all individuals. On the other hand, moral obligations for humans might vary depending on their existential status, according to ethics grounded in the primacy of existence. Moral oughts and ought nots are established by human existential grades in this ethics. This ethical model is flexible and dynamic.

One of the most important sources in the inference of Shariah rulings is Ijma (consensus), to the extent that it is considered to be more important and more valid than the Qur'an and the Sunnah in denoting the Shariah rulings, while the texts of the Qur'an and the Sunnah alone are sufficient and the most valid sources as arguments in Shariah rulings. This research examines and analyzes the various viewpoints and arguments that have been presented regarding the validity of consensus through a descriptive, analytical and critical method, because in order to prove it in Islamic Sharia and its validity, a definite argument is needed. The result of this research suggests that the arguments for the validity of the consensus, even though the book, the tradition, and the rational method were used, it does not fulfill the purpose, and in a way, the conflict between those who support it in citing these arguments reduces its credit value. As a result, it is not considered among the arguments of inferring rulings based on the "validity of previous existence". The novelty of this article is the critical study of consensus as an independent argument from the point of view of the Sunnis in inferencing rulings, respecting the authentic sources of the Sunnis and proving its invalidity in inferencing jurisprudential rulings.

The Big Five Inventory (BFI) is one of the most widely used personality questionnaires, but very few studies have been conducted on its psychometric properties in Iranian population. This study was carried out with the aim of studying the psychometric properties of the BFI questionnaire. For this purpose, 390 university students in Tehran (210 girls and 180 boys) with an age range of 18 to 56 years (M = 27.52; SD = 8.79) were selected using the convenience sampling method and completed BFI and NEO-FFI questionnaires. Cronbach's alpha, multitrait-multimethod matrix, and confirmatory factor analysis were used to estimate the psychometric properties of the questionnaire. The result of the confirmatory factor analysis showed that 15 of the 44 items did not have a strong factor loading (higher than 0.40) on the corresponding factors and were therefore removed from the questionnaire. The fit indices showed that the Persian version of 29 questions (BFI-29) with 5 factors has a good fit with the data. The reliability analysis also showed that the range of Cronbach's alpha coefficients of the factors is from 0.70 to 0.79. The lowest Cronbach's alpha coefficient was related to agreeableness factor and the highest was related to conscientiousness. The findings from the multitrait-multimethod matrix showed that the BFI-29 questionnaire has good convergent and divergent validity with the NEO-FFI questionnaire. In general, based on the results of the present study, it can be said that the BFI-29 questionnaire has desirable psychometric properties and whenever a short tool for personality measurement is needed, this questionnaire can be used.

The question of the originality of existence and validity of essence is one of the major issues in Transcendental Wisdom. But to consider existence as original and essence as valid; meaning that the external reality is the true example of existence and essence is limited to the sphere of validity, supposition and illusion is not approved. Hence this belief will entangle us in a challenge which can not be dealt with unless we accept a new reading of the validity of essence.This article has tried to provide the readers with three kinds of interpretation of Mulla Sadra's writings: 1) To regard essence by its nature limited to the mind. 2) To know essence as-equal to existence. 3) To regard essence not as equal to existence but as the illusion of existence. And finally what the article tries to prove is that the first interpretation is stronger and more logical than the other interpretations in discussing essentials, accidentals, substance, accident, the ten categories and natural universals.It can be claimed that the meaning of the validity of essence in Mulla Sadra's works is to study essence as essence, otherwise the essence as an entity in the external world equals existence and essence cannot define existence or the illusion of it.

In Western thinking, one of the most important proofs of God's existence is reasoning through possibility and necessity. Analyzing the process of its various expressions, the characteristics of each of those expressions and their distinctions, as well as evaluating their cognitive validity and achieving a criterion or a solution for evaluation, is the motivation of the current research. The result of this research is that all expressions have been presented in two ways or with two approaches: 1. Expressions through causality or causal explanation,2. Expressions through description and explanation or non-causal explanations. On the other hand, by examining Aquinas's and Locke's expositions, which are examples of causal explanations, we are led to the conclusion that those expositions are either reasoning through occurrence or reasoning through non-causal explanation, not reasoning through possibility and necessity, nor reasoning based on causal explanation. Therefore, their epistemological validity is under question. On the other hand, Leibniz's argument and other explanations through non-causal explanation fail to carry epistemological validity, and it is not possible to achieve certain knowledge, even based on the correct assumption.

Mullā,Ṣ, adrā,in the issue of principality of existence with the negation of the conceptual part of existence considers the nonconditioned as a source of division to have extensional unity and individual plurality. The truth of existence has collective and expansionary unity and it is the basis of the principality of existence and the subject of philosophy for this reason. He has two different attitudes towards the existence of the positive condition in the discussion of the validity of the nature of his own. The separation of the principality of existence in two meanings is the result of this discussion: In the first sense, the root of external realties and what fills the external world is the existence of the nonconditioned as a source of division, and the nature or the ranges of the truth of the unconditioned of existence are consequently realized. Ṣ, adrā,in the second and final view considers the validity of nature as a mere mentality by rejecting any external distinction of existence and nature and considers the existence of nature as a function of the existence of the soul and its human minds and its mental aspects.